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In his account of what he calls the ‘mechanical principles’ of action, 
Thomas Reid distinguishes between deliberate, willed actions and those 
caused by instincts or habits. He holds that that agents can only be held 
morally responsible with respect to willed actions, as it is only in such 
cases that the agent acts freely on his libertarian model of agency. Nev-
ertheless, in his later writings Reid seems to suggest that instinctual be-
haviour is both prior to and a precondition for the performance of free 
action. In this brief paper, I want to first introduce Reid’s theory of ac-
tion and then expand upon this account in order to show that it goes 
some way to mitigate the criticisms raised by Louis Loeb and others 
against Reid, namely that Reid is content to rest with an account that 
rejects any attempt to explain the origin of beliefs that arise from human 
nature. Loeb portrays Hume as the superior philosopher due in part to 
his willingness to open up the black box of the mind for scientific inspec-
tion. I want to claim that Loeb misses the mark here; despite the fact that 
Hume does attempt to give us a psychological account of the origins of 
certain beliefs, it is crippled by the implausible restrictions Hume places 
on his system. Reid’s account, in contrast, employs a different concep-
tion of explanation and, as a result, offers a more plausible account that 
is not hindered by an unnecessary emphasis on introspection.
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I. Agents, First Principles and Free Action
Aside from his common sense epistemology, Thomas Reid is possibly 
best known for his libertarian, agent causalist account of human action. 
Agents are uncaused causes of their volitions for Reid: when one initi-
ates an act, at least under certain conditions, one is not caused to do 
so. Correspondingly, at least some of one’s actions are not determined 
either by prior states external to, or internal to, oneself. Where, in an 
act of throwing a ball, the deliberate movement of my arm is caused by 
a volition, only I can be said to be the true cause of the movement, and 
to be morally responsible for the consequences of the thrown ball as its 
path intersects a neighbour’s window. Nothing in the prior history of the 
external world or my psychology determined that I will that particular 
volition at that particular time. To hold this is to hold that agents pos-
sess active power. Just what this is cannot be defined, according to Reid: 
it does not follow, however, that we do not have a conception of it. We 
have, “very early, from our constitution, a conviction or belief of some 
degree of active power in ourselves”: there is a “principle, which ap-
pears very early in the mind of man, is, that we are efficient causes in our 
deliberate and voluntary actions” (EAP 4.2).1
The freedom of the will is accordingly one of Reid’s first principles of 
contingent truth, the sixth in Reid’s list of fourteen:
6. Another first principle, I think, is, That we have some degree of power over 
our actions, and the determinations of our will. (EIP 6.5)
The principles Reid is interested in uncovering are those principles 
to which all of mankind are committed, arising as they do directly from 
our shared human nature. These principles are not learned or acquired 
from experience, nor were they discovered at some prior point in human 
history. Such principles are implicit in the structure of all languages; 
thus all societies and cultures share a pretheoretical commitment to the 
beliefs. They have “the consent of ages and nations, of the learned and 
unlearned” (EIP 6.4). Such principles are self-evidently true in the sense 
that reflection on them commands assent (though, of course, one can 
call them into question or submit them to sceptical challenge, as Reid’s 
contemporary and main foil Hume clearly demonstrates).
 1 I will follow standard practice by citing passages from the Essays on the Active 
Powers of Man (1788) (henceforth ‘EAP’) and the Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man 
(1785) (‘EIP’) by reference to essay, (part, where applicable) and chapter. Passages 
from An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense (1764) (‘IHM’) 
are cited by chapter and section.
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Reid’s first principles do not admit of proof: in a nutshell, there is 
nothing more fundamental that could play a justificatory role with re-
gard to belief in a first principle. Our capacity for reason, the reliability 
of perceptual experience, the reliability of causal reasoning – these are 
all first principles and thus have the same epistemic status. No one first 
principle can serve to justify another. They have to be identified through 
their possession of the characteristic traits noted above. The identifica-
tion of a first principle thus involves linguistic, sociological and histori-
cal investigation, as well as introspective reflection upon one’s own dox-
astic commitments.
As James Harris notes, these considerations are not intended to 
prove a first principle; as just mentioned, the principles are fundamen-
tal and do not admit of proof. Instead, they “show that philosophy can 
be brought to bear on the task of distinguishing genuine first principles 
from mere pretenders to that status” (Harris, 186); they are not for the 
purpose of showing that such principles are true. To go briefly beyond 
the scope of the present paper, Reid thinks that we are committed to tak-
ing such principles as true. To reject some but to retain others is to dis-
play and illegitimate and ungrounded favouritism, as all the principles 
come from the “same shop” (IHM 6.20) and thus deserve equal credence; 
to reject all is to depart from the realm of philosophy and rationality 
entirely.
Returning to the matter of the belief in one’s possession of active 
power, Reid offers five considerations in support of the contention that 
this is a first principle:
The arguments I have adduced are taken from these five topics: 1. That 
there are many things that we can affirm or deny concerning power, with 
understanding. 2. That there are, in all languages, words signifying, not 
only power, but signifying many other things that imply power, such 
as, action and passion, cause and effect, energy, operation, and others. 
3. That in the structure of all languages, there is an active and passive 
form in verbs and participles, and a different construction adapted to 
these forms, of which diversity no account can be given, but that it has 
been intended to distinguish action from passion. 4. That there are many 
operations of the human mind familiar to every man come to the use 
of reason, and necessary in the ordinary conduct of life, which imply 
a conviction of some degree of power in ourselves and In others. 5. That 
the desire of power is one of the strongest passions of human nature. 
(EAP 1.2 pp. 19–20)
Here we see Reid offering evidence of all the sorts mentioned above 
in support of the claim that one’s belief that one possesses active power 
is a first principle. The distinction between active and passive verbs re-
flects a commitment to the distinction between the actor and those acted 
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upon, a distinction found across all cultural and linguistic borders. We 
display a prephilosophical commitment to the existence of such power 
in ourselves and others, as when I believe in my power to stand up, or 
turn the light off, or reach the bus station by six o’clock. Note, too, that 
on Reid’s account the desire for power just is the desire that one’s active 
power be more efficacious or have greater reach. What, though, is it to 
possess this active power?
Reid is committed to a two-way conception of power: an agent pos-
sesses active power if and only if she is able both to will to perform an 
action and to refrain from willing to do so. The free agent can perform an 
action or refrain from doing so in the same set of circumstances, where 
these circumstances include her possession of just those preferences and 
desires. The totality of her psychological states does not entail that she at-
tempts to engage in a particular course of action. In other words, should 
she choose to, the free agent can act against her own desires; her desires 
do not determine her behaviour. Preferences, desires, sentiments, beliefs 
– no combination of these psychological states can entail that a free agent 
act in a particular manner. Should there be such an entailment, then the 
agent is not free with respect to that action. As noted above, the Reidian 
agent is thus truly an uncaused cause.
Reid, therefore, is an agent-causalist: the true causes of human ac-
tions are agents, not prior events (irrespective of whether these are 
construed as located internally or externally to the subject). William 
L. Rowe summarises Reid’s position thus:
On Reid’s view of agent-causation, the following three conditions are 
necessary and sufficient for X to be an agent-cause of some event e:
1. X is a substance that had power to bring about e.
2. X exerted its power to bring about e.
3. X had the power to refrain from bringing about e.
(Rowe, 227)
The notion of liberty to which Reid’s account of power gives rise 
is implicit in the preceding. It is only where one possesses this active 
power with respect to a particular action that one can be said to possess 
liberty, to be a free agent.
By the Liberty of a Moral Agent, I understand, a power over the determinations 
of his own Will.
If, in any action, he had power to will what he did, or not to will it, in 
that action he is free. But if, in every voluntary action, the determination 
of his will be the necessary consequence of something involuntary in the 
state of his mind, or of something in his external circumstances, he is not 
free; he has not what I call the Liberty of a Moral Agent, but is subject to 
Necessity. (EAP 4.1)
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An agent might possess liberty with respect to certain actions, yet be 
subject to necessity in the case of others. It might well be the case that 
I acted freely when I purchased the excessively large bar of chocolate 
– I did not experience myself as determined to do so, I seriously con-
templated buying other alternatives in its place, in similar circumstances 
I do not always buy absurd quantities of chocolate, etc. – but that does 
not entail that I acted freely when eating the whole bar against my better 
judgement. The consumption of the first half of the bar might have trig-
gered some compulsive or addictive behaviour that left me determined 
to continue until the chocolate was no more. The addict’s injecting him-
self with heroin is most likely an unfree act; his decision what to wear on 
the way to meeting his dealer, less so.
The exertion of active power, and thus the liberty of a moral agent, 
has an important intellectual dimension. One cannot be free in this sense 
if one does not possess some grasp of what it is that one is seeking to 
achieve and of how one might go about achieving it. Liberty requires 
understanding on the part of the agent, in that a volition presupposes 
a conception of its object, the action it is intended to bring about:
This liberty supposes the agent to have understanding and will; for the 
determinations of the will are the sole object about which this power is 
employed; and there can be no will without such a degree of understand-
ing, at least, as gives the conception of that which we will. 
The liberty of a moral agent implies, not only a conception of what he 
wills, but some degree of practical judgment or reason. (EAP 4.1)
So, Reid holds that a free action – that is, an action for which the 
agent is morally responsible – is an action that the agent willed but could 
have refrained from willing, involving a goal that the agent possessed 
a conception of at the time at which she acted and an exercise of practical 
reason. I am responsible for shattering the window with the kicked ball; 
a new-born infant is not responsible for punching its parent on the nose, 
as it had no conception of what would happen (even at the level of basic 
bodily movement) when it exerted itself in just that way.
We should not think that Reid’s account of human behaviour is ex-
cessively intellectualised, however. Yes, we do engage in careful, deliber-
ate actions that see us grasp our goals, plan a course of action and choose 
to act (to exercise our active power) in pursuit of those goals, but plausi-
bly the largest part of our day to day behaviour is not of this sort. We en-
gage in habitual behaviour, act without deliberation or conscious plan-
ning, unreflectively respond to hunger, itches and other stimuli. Not all 
human activity, to put it in Reidian terms, involves the exercise of active 
power alongside a conception of one’s aims and a practical judgement; 
indeed, any account that claimed that all human activity possessed these 
characteristics would be an exceedingly poor theory of human nature. 
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Reid, the astute observer of humankind, is well aware of this. He rec-
ognises that there are other forms of activity, broadly construed, that 
human beings engage in. Reid spends the largest part of his third of his 
Essays on the Active Powers on non-rational principles of action and di-
vides these into the mechanical and the animal principles of action. The 
mechanical principles of action include instinct and habit; the animal 
principles include appetites, benevolence, passion, disposition. In the 
following, we need only need draw upon the former. 
Here are Reid’s characterisations of the two mechanical principles:
By instinct, I mean a natural blind impulse to certain actions, without 
having any end in view, without deliberation, and very often without any 
conception of what we do. (EAP 3.1.2)
Habit: acquired, rather than natural. “Both operate without will or inten-
tion, without thought, and therefore may be called mechanical principles.” 
(EAP 3.1.3)
We will return to the role of instinct, this “blind impulse”, below.
II. The Explanation of First Principles (or the Lack Thereof)
As seen above, Reid thinks that first principles do not admit of proof or 
justification. They are foundational, and the belief in them ungrounded 
and instinctual, arising directly from human nature. As recent commen-
tators have noted, this appears closer to Hume’s account of the origins 
of our core beliefs than Reid himself appears to notice. Our utilisation of 
causal explanations and of induction, our beliefs in the existence of the 
self and of the external world, all of these stem from the ultimately irre-
sistible operation of the imagination, according to Hume. Human nature 
has not left it up to us to decide whether or not we should accept that 
food that nourished us one day will continue to do so on another. This is, 
of course, the naturalistic turn in Hume, and it is a move that Reid does 
not discuss, choosing instead to focus on Hume’s apparently sceptical 
conclusions, as Loeb points out. Nevertheless – unsurprisingly – there 
are differences between the accounts of the two contemporaries. These 
include differences concerning the justificatory status of the principles: 
is belief in the deliverances of human nature warranted as well as un-
avoidable?; do these natural beliefs transmit warrant to further beliefs?, 
etc. The difference that concerns us here does not relate to the epistemic 
status of the first principles, however. Rather, the difference, latched on 
to by Loeb, concerns the attitudes of Reid and Hume to the explanation 
of beliefs of this kind: Hume explains the origins of such beliefs (princi-
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pally through the operation of the imagination), while Reid declines to 
offer any such explanations of the origins of his first principles.
It is such a refusal that has given rise to the charge of mysterianism 
against Reid:
Whatever latent properties there are to mind are in principle undis-
coverable, and so should not be the subject of philosophical speculation. 
There is no means of moving from taxonomy to inquiry into the possible 
existence of underlying general laws. The ‘how’-question that Reid him-
self takes to be definitive of all philosophical inquiry is unanswerable 
when it comes to perception, memory, imagination, belief in testimony, 
and inductive reasoning. That is to say, it is unanswerable quite gener-
ally in a science of the mind. (James Harris, “Reid on the Character of 
a Science of the Mind,” 6, quoted in Copenhaver)
As Rebecca Copenhaver notes, there are several grounds for think-
ing that Reid holds that mental phenomena do not admit of the kinds 
of explanation found in the physical sciences: the absence of laws or in-
formative generalisations concerning mental states (where this would 
include, but not be limited to, psychophysical laws); the absence of re-
ductive explanations in Reid’s science of the mind; a pious respect for 
the complexity of God’s work combined with an acknowledgement of 
the limitations of the human mind and science; a concern that a causal 
explanation of the beliefs will undermine the appearance of them being 
warranted, and so on. Whether one reads this strand in Reid in a posi-
tive light, with Nicholas Wolterstorff, or in a negative, the important (if 
more limited) point for us is that Reid refuses to offer an account of the 
origin of the beliefs in first principles in terms of prior mental states or 
physical causes.2
This is a recurring theme throughout Reid’s writing, as these two 
passages from the Essays on the Intellectual Powers and the Essays on the 
Active Powers demonstrate:
But, whatever be the nature of those impressions upon the organs, nerves, 
and brain, we perceive nothing without them. Experience informs that 
it is so; but we cannot give a reason why it is so. In the constitution of 
man, perception, by fixed laws of nature, is connected with those impres-
sions; but we can discover no necessary connection. The Supreme Being 
has seen fit to limit our power of perception; so that we perceive not with-
out such impressions; and this is all we know of the matter. (EIP 2.3)
That there is an established harmony between our willing certain mo-
tions of our bodies, and the operation of the nerves and muscles that pro-
duces these motions, is a fact known by experience. This volition is an 
act of the mind. But whether this act of the mind have any physical effect 
upon the nerves and muscles; or whether it be only an occasion of their 
 2 See Wolterstorff (2001).
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being acted upon by some other efficient, according to the established 
laws of nature, is hid from us. So dark is our conception of our own pow-
er when we trace it to its origins. (EAP 1.8)
Here we find Reid refusing to engage in theorising about the facts 
concerning the relationship between physiological processes and per-
ceptual experience on the one hand, and volitions and bodily move-
ments on the other. While it might be tempting to treat these as instances 
of Reid’s commendable refusal to engage in metaphysical speculation 
within scientific contexts on Newtonian grounds, it is plausibly more 
appropriate to read these as refusals to engage in legitimate scientific 
theorising about phenomena that clearly fall within the scope of the sci-
ence of humankind.
This is Louis Loeb’s view. Loeb holds that by “claiming that psycho-
logical mechanisms are beyond our grasp” (Loeb, 75), Reid gives illegiti-
mate support to his own theory of first principles. If one cannot even in 
principle begin to investigate the psychological mechanisms that under-
pin or give rise to the first principles, then the apparent possibility that 
scientific investigation of the operations of the mind might undermine 
the status or independence of the principles is ruled out.
Reid’s first principles cannot suffer [this] disadvantage. He forecloses any 
appeal to empirical psychology to call the epistemic status of any of his 
first principles into question. ...
There is a second way in which the doctrine of the incomprehensi-
bility of the mind shelters Reid’s multiplication of first principles. … If 
the operative mechanisms are for us a black box, empirical psychology is 
powerless to support a reduction by resolving one first principle into an-
other. Nor can we compare mechanisms in order to spot ones that might 
strike us as outliers. (76)
Reid’s first principles are therefore shielded from whatever results 
future progress in psychology might throw up.  While one might won-
der whether beliefs generated by the imagination on the basis of a trans-
fer of vivacity grounded in a repetition of impressions and ideas could 
even in principle be warranted, no similar concern can arise for Reid’s 
first principles. Such challenges or worries are simply ruled out by Re-
id’s locating the workings of the mind beyond human comprehension. 
This, Loeb claims, “is a breach in Reid’s naturalism” (76). As a result of 
this, Loeb sees Hume as the better naturalist philosopher of mind: he 
opens up the black box and postulates mechanisms that explain the ori-
gins of core beliefs, through the transfer of vivacity between impressions 
and ideas, etc., and identifies connections between the different beliefs. 
Whatever the merits of Hume’s theory, at the very least it is a theory that 
sits within a naturalistic, scientific framework.
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III. The Role of Instinct in Reid’s Account  
of Infant Development
If Loeb is correct about Reid’s attitude to any attempts to engage in an 
exploration of the psychological mechanisms relating to the first princi-
ples, then he is surely right that Hume wins the best Scottish naturalistic 
philosopher of the eighteenth century award. However, there are other 
factors that we have to take into account if we are to have a fuller picture 
of Reid’s attitude towards the explanation of first principles in front of 
us. I want to gesture briefly towards two relevant points before attempt-
ing to develop another line of response.
Firstly, it is possible to find textual grounds for rejecting the read-
ing of Reid as a mysterian. Rebecca Copenhaver develops several strong 
lines of argument in response to Harris and others in her 2006 article ‘Is 
Thomas Reid a Mysterian?’. I do not intend to rehearse them here, not 
least as they are not directed towards Loeb’s specific criticism. Neverthe-
less, it is worth recognising that Copenhaver demonstrates that Reid’s 
account of the mind is wholly in keeping with his particular Newtonian 
commitments. Reid, Copenhaver claims, “does not hold that mind, more 
than body, resists explanation by the new science” (449). Both domains 
admit of causal explanations, even though causation itself is fundamen-
tally mysterious and any attempts to explain it further breach Newto-
nian principles against metaphysical speculation. Reid can maintain this 
position because his account of causation is not necessitarian through 
and through: a true cause is an exercise of active power and thus is not 
itself necessitated. Accordingly, the laws of nature – the observable reg-
ularities in God’s behaviour, for Reid – are only contingently, but not 
metaphysically, necessary.
We can also find many passages in Reid that seem far removed from 
what might be expected from someone who holds that science cannot 
tell us anything about the operations of the mind:
What is necessary for the conduct of our animal life, the bountiful Author 
of Nature hath made manifest to all men. But there are many other choice 
secrets of Nature, the discovery of which enlarges the power and exalts 
the state of man. These are left to be discovered by the proper use of our 
rational powers. They are hid, not that they may be always concealed 
from human knowledge, but that we may be excited to search for them. 
This is the proper business of a Philosopher, and it is the glory of a man, 
and the best reward of his labour, to discover what Nature has thus con-
cealed. (EIP 2.18)
The second point relates to Reid’s conception of his wider project. 
Reid, “in his search for first principles of common sense … is seeking, 
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like Hume, to draw a map of human nature” (Broadie, 108). As McDer-
mid puts it, Reid’s main aim is “to establish a sceptic-proof scheme in 
which ordinary perception, science, morality, and religion are under-
stood not as enemies or rivals, but as different branches of a single tree” 
(21). Reid is a scientist of human nature every bit as much as he is an 
epistemologist or metaphysician: his commitment to Newtonian princi-
ples is explicit and runs through his entire oeuvre. Newton’s first rule is 
“a golden rule; it is the true and proper test, by which what is sound and 
solid in philosophy may be distinguished from what is hollow and vain” 
(EIP 1.3). As Paul Wood writes, “[b]y 1729 he was deeply immersed in 
the study of the mathematical technicalities of Newton’s Principia and, 
for the rest of his life, Reid investigated an array of empirical and theo-
retical problems set by Newton in astronomy, mechanics, and optics” 
(Wood, 57). Reid’s project is a Newtonian one to the core; we should not 
take lightly any suggestion that he would willingly and knowingly set 
aside these principles upon turning his attention to the operations of the 
mind in relation to the first principles.3
Of course, these considerations are far from conclusive: it is entirely 
possible that Reid held a deep commitment to naturalism and Newto-
nianism yet, as Loeb put it, that he breached this commitment in this 
particular case, implausible as this might otherwise appear. 
A better way of approaching this issue is, I believe, to try to extract 
a picture of the kinds of explanation that Reid is willing to entertain with 
respect to the first principles from his discussion of the origin of our idea 
of active power. Reid holds that we have no direct conception of our ac-
tive power, only a relative one:
Power is not an object of any of our external senses, nor even an object of 
consciousness. (EAP 1.1)
Nevertheless,
we have very early, from our constitution, a conviction or belief of some 
degree of active power in ourselves. This belief, however, is not con-
sciousness: For we may be deceived in it; but the testimony of conscious-
ness can never deceive. (EAP 1.1) 
Where does the conception of, and belief in, our own power come 
from? In both the Essays on the Active Powers and in his later paper ‘Of 
Power’, Reid provides some comments on the origins of the belief in the 
sixth principle. There is a “principle, which appears very early in the 
mind of man, ... that we are efficient causes in our deliberate and volun-
 3 See also Laudan (1970), McMullin (2001), Ducheyne (2006) and Lindsay (2013).
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tary actions” (EAP 4.2). This belief is grounded in the experience of one’s 
own activity:
From the consciousness of our own activity, seems to be derived not only 
the clearest, but the only conception we can form of activity, or the exer-
tion of active power. (EAP 1.5)
Clearly, this needs unpacking: a superficial reading would have Reid 
holding both that one only grasps that one possesses active power af-
ter one becomes aware of one’s exertions of said power, and that the 
exercise of an active power presupposes a grasp of the fact that one is 
in possession of active power. This is, of course, not what Reid intends. 
This is made explicit in his later development of this story further in ‘Of 
Power’. Here we read of infants engaging in undirected exertions, only 
consequently being able to correlate the exertions with the bodily actions 
they bring about. What this demonstrates is that for Reid, humans are 
from the outset, and prior to their grasp of the sixth first principle, active. 
I am rather inclined to think that our first exertions are instinctive, with-
out any distinct conception of the event that is to follow, consequently 
without will to produce that event. And that finding by experience that 
such exertions are followed by such events, we learn to make the exertion 
voluntarily and deliberately, as often as we desire to produce the event. 
And when we know or believe that the event depends upon our exer-
tion, we have the conception of power in ourselves to produce that event. 
(‘Of Power’, 3)4
We find infants engaging in blind exertions – what we might think 
of flailings, the kind that find parents poked in the eye and kicked on 
the chest – and only later come to develop a grasp of the correlations 
between the exertions and bodily movements to such an extent that they 
can move their limbs at will. We can imagine Reid, the astute observer 
of human behaviour, watching his nine children in their infancy as they 
develop control over their actions and acquire a sense of agency. It is cru-
cial to recognise that the child does not possess full agency; there is no 
conception of what is willed, and so the child cannot possess the liberty 
of a moral agent. The account is grounded in our ability to engage (or 
refrain from engaging) in some rudimentary form of activity at a more 
basic developmental stage than the possession of agency as described 
earlier.5 On the story Reid offers, this knowledge of our own agency, and 
 4 Henceforth ‘OP’.
 5 Thus I disagree with Gideon Yaffe when he writes “the baby, for instance, no-
tices that the hand moves following the instinctive exertion to move it, but there is no 
reason to think that the baby is active with respect to the movement” (Yaffe, 27).
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thus the belief picked out by the sixth first principle, arises from experi-
ence; it is not innate, nor does it appear in a vacuum.
This infant behaviour is nonintentional, an example of the kind of in-
stinctual behaviour outlined above. The exertion is mere “natural blind 
impulse” with no “end in view” or deliberation. The infant possesses 
both a rudimentary form of active power and a natural inclination to 
exert the power, even in the absence of any knowledge of possible out-
comes. Human beings, on Reid’s picture, are fundamentally active, self-
moving creatures, and this is still true prior to the acquisition of capacity 
for understanding.
This account of the origin of our conception of power, makes it to be the 
fruit of experience and not innate; though it must be as early as any delib-
erate voluntary exertion to produce a certain event. (OP 3)
Reid’s story, grounded in instinctual behaviour – however brief 
it may be – gives us an account of the development of (and, accordingly, 
necessary preconditions for) the possession of the belief captured by first 
principle number six. What it also demonstrates is the kind of explana-
tion that Reid thinks appropriate for the first principles: it is not reliant 
on the postulation of relations between psychological states and mecha-
nisms in the way that Hume’s explanations are; rather, it looks towards 
observable, empirical evidence from human behaviour (in this case, 
infant development) in order to determine the actual conditions under 
which such beliefs do and must arise. It does not seem wildly implau-
sible to suggest that this Reidian form of explanation is of a legitimate, 
scientifically respectable sort.
IV. Explanation and Foundationalism in Hume and Reid
What we see here is, I want to suggest, a dispute concerning what scien-
tifically respectable explanations of natural or instinctual beliefs should 
look like. The differing conceptions in play reflect the epistemologies of 
the respective philosophers. In the case of Hume, we find: 
i.  explanations that look toward the inner operations of the mind, 
these uncovered through introspection rather than behavioural 
and publicly accessible evidence; and
ii.  the favouring of explanations grounded in a conception of per-
ception as intrinsically passive and deterministic.
This allows Hume to look for necessitated (at least in the Humean 
sense) psychological operations where we can find causal relations be-
tween types of psychological state. So, repeated correlations cause the 
mind to form expectations and to transfer vivacity, resulting in the cre-
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ation of new beliefs, and so on. It is this kind of explanation that Loeb 
gives credit for; we are looking inside the black box, at the causally ne-
cessitated mechanisms and the perceptions upon which they operate. 
This, Loeb appears to hold, is a true naturalistic psychology.
It is certainly the case that Reid eschews such forms of explanation. 
Whether this is due to a genuine mysterianism, or a legitimate epistemic 
humility that recognises the failings of eighteenth century theories of the 
mind combined with a commitment to a form of Newtonianism hostile 
to metaphysical speculation is up for debate; the crucial point is that 
Reid rejects the explanatory paradigm favoured by Hume and praised 
by Loeb.
The account of the origins of the awareness of agency discussed 
above looks towards different kinds of evidence. Reid does allow intro-
spective evidence – in fact, as with Hume, this he treats this as the most 
important kind – but his evidence is not restricted to this. In its place, we 
find the kind of wide-ranging search for empirically accessible evidence 
that characterised the hunt for first principles. In particular, we have:
i.  explanations that admit empirical evidence from a wider range of 
sources, including publicly available behavioural evidence; and
ii.  the permitting of explanations that ascribe a non-necessitarian ac-
tive power to the subjects of study.
In a wider discussion of the respective merits of the two philoso-
phers Penelope Maddy argues that Reid is the better scientist of human-
ity. Lying behind this claim is not just Hume’s failure to question the 
commitment to a widely-held, problematic perceptual theory that reifies 
perceptions; rather, the major difference concerns the methodologies of 
the two contemporaries. The true point of divergence is Reid’s rejection 
of a Cartesian model of introspection as the primary means of knowl-
edge acquisition. Not only does this appear to open the doors to sceptical 
challenges, it cripples the study of humankind from the outset:6
In place of the restricted Cartesian perspective, Reid proposes to begin by 
trusting to the general reliability of all his faculties—‘that furniture which 
nature hath given to the human understanding . . . a part of our constitu-
tion . . . the common sense of mankind.’ His disagreement with Hume over 
the Theory of Ideas is a mere footnote to this fundamental shift. (Maddy, 
32)
If Maddy’s analysis is right, then once we are free from the grasp 
of this Cartesian foundationalism, we are able to engage in a search for 
explanation that utilises the full resources of all of the sciences. There is 
 6 As Maddy correctly notes in her insightful analysis, just this kind of scepticism 
plays a vital role in Hume’s route to his naturalism (Maddy, 33).
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no longer any need to restrict oneself merely to the inspection of one’s 
own mental operations. By also admitting the sorts evidence from soci-
ology, anthropology, linguistics and certain kinds of psychology, Reid 
can engage in the proper observation of humankind. This allows Reid 
to produce a better naturalistic, scientific account of the origins of our 
beliefs and the operations of the mind. One might still worry that Hume 
does something that Reid does not: he tells us about what is going on 
within the mind. But we should not forget that he does so only by reify-
ing perceptions and postulating speculative mechanisms – specifically 
the imagination – for which we have no empirical evidence, and which, 
looked at on their own terms, appear deeply suspect. The kinds of evi-
dence Reid endorses should be enough for any eighteenth century phi-
losopher.
Turning to the second feature of the respective forms of explanation 
above, the passivity or otherwise of the mind, we can see how different 
views on this could have a significant impact on the forms of explanation 
that are seen as admissible. On the Humean model of the mind, all obser-
vation is fundamentally passive, including the introspective observation 
of one’s own mind. The appearance and ordering of perceptions is de-
termined by a combination of external stimuli (or “unknown causes”, as 
Hume has it)7 and the principles governing the association of ideas. The 
subject has no further ability to influence the manner in which impres-
sions and ideas enter in her mind. Furthermore, we cannot even grasp 
what such power would amount to: we do not observe power, nor can 
we infer it.
All ideas are deriv’d from, and represent impressions. We never have any 
impression, that contains any power or efficacy. We never therefore have 
any idea of power. (T 1.3.14.11)
Some have asserted, that we feel an energy, or power, in our own 
mind; and that having in this manner acquir’d the idea of power, we 
transfer that quality to matter, where we are not able immediately to dis-
cover it. … In short, the actions of the mind are, in this respect, the same 
with those of matter. We perceive only their constant conjunction; nor can 
we ever reason beyond it. No internal impression has an apparent energy, 
more than external objects have. (T 1.3.14.12, App.)
Once such a conception of introspective awareness is in place, any 
explanation of the Reidian sort that makes essential reference to one’s ac-
tive power is ruled out. Instinctive exertions, the blind exercise of one’s 
active power, are a fiction. We can have no idea of any such thing, there-
fore there is nothing to play the necessary explanatory role.
 7 T 1.1.2.1. I follow standard conventions for citing Hume’s Treatise: book, part, 
section, paragraph.
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As we have seen, Reid rejects this perceptual model, thus he is able 
to allow that experience can deliver us knowledge of our own agency. 
For Reid, voluntary activity wears its connection to power on its sleeve, 
‘it somehow smacks of power’, as Van Cleve has it (373). One cannot be 
aware of one’s voluntary activity without being aware of one’s power. 
The awareness of the relationship between exertion and bodily move-
ment is not a case of the agent passively observing a relation of constant 
conjunction. The agent’s awareness of her power (including power as in-
stinctively exercised) is somehow built in to the nature of the experience 
of acting. This thought might appear mysterious if we have the classic 
Humean/empiricist account of experience in mind; but this is precisely 
what is at stake. Experience, especially experience of one’s activity, need 
not and ought not be construed on the passive perceiver model.
Stuart Hampshire makes just this criticism against twentieth century 
empiricist thought:
The deepest mistake in empiricist theories of perception ... has been the 
representation of human beings as passive observers receiving impres-
sions from ‘outside’ of the mind, where the ‘outside’ includes their own 
bodies. In fact I find myself from the very beginning able to act upon 
objects around me. In this context to act is to move at will my own body, 
that persisting physical thing, and thereby bring about perceived move-
ment of other physical things. I not only perceive my body; I also control 
it; I not only perceive external objects, I also manipulate them. ... I find 
myself living in a medium of physical action and reaction, and I do not al-
ways need to infer from my observations alone that I have made a move-
ment of some particular kind. This felt resistance to my will defines for 
me, in conjunction with my perceptions, my own situation as an object 
among other objects. Both perceptions and bodily sensations contribute 
to this elementary discovery; even taken together, they do not consti-
tute the whole of it. I know directly, that I tried, or set myself, to move... 
No knowledge is more direct and underived than this knowledge. 
(Hampshire, 47–8)
If we reject the two tenets of Humean theory discussed above, the 
Reidian approach to explanation appears more compelling. We can 
investigate the operations of the mind, including questions about the 
origins of, and necessary conditions for, belief in the first principles, by 
using all the resources of science. There is no need to cripple one’s inves-
tigations from the outset by committing oneself to an implausible Carte-
sian starting point; nor need the scientist of humanity start by attempting 
to fend off the scepticism that this invites in. When we take these factors 
into account, Hume’s methodology for the study of the mind seems far 
less appealing. In comparison to an implausible account based around 
the transfer of vivacity by the imagination, Reid’s failure to posit inter-
nal mechanisms seems downright virtuous. That is not and should not 
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be what we want from an eighteenth century theory of the mind, not if 
we want it to have lasting value. It is no wonder that Maddy finds Reid 
to have more in common with contemporary scientists; he is the better 
student of human nature.8
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Summary
In his account of what he calls the ‘mechanical principles’ of action, Thomas Reid 
distinguishes between deliberate, willed actions and those caused by instincts 
or habits. He holds that that agents can only be held morally responsible with 
respect to willed actions, as it is only in such cases that the agent acts freely on 
his libertarian model of agency. Nevertheless, in his later writings Reid seems to 
suggest that instinctual behaviour is both prior to and a precondition for the per-
formance of free action. In this brief paper, I want to first introduce Reid’s theory 
of action and then expand upon this account in order to show that it goes some 
way to mitigate the criticisms raised by Louis Loeb and others against Reid, 
namely that Reid is content to rest with an account that rejects any attempt to 
explain the origin of beliefs that arise from human nature. Loeb portrays Hume 
as the superior philosopher due in part to his willingness to open up the black 
box of the mind for scientific inspection. I want to claim that Loeb misses the 
mark here; despite the fact that Hume does attempt to give us a psychological 
account of the origins of certain beliefs, it is crippled by the implausible restric-
tions Hume places on his system. Reid’s account, in contrast, employs a different 
conception of explanation and, as a result, offers a more plausible account that is 
not hindered by an unnecessary emphasis on introspection.




Instynkt i wyjaśnienie w Thomasa Reida teorii działania
W swym opisie tego, co nazywa „mechanicznymi zasadami” działania, Tho-
mas Reid rozróżnia działania rozmyślne, wolicjonalne i te, które są wynikiem 
instynktu bądź nawyku. Twierdzi, że podmiot działający można uznać za od-
powiedzialny moralnie jedynie za działania wolicjonalne, gdyż w przyjętym 
przezeń libertariańskim modelu działania tylko w ich przypadku można mó-
wić o wolności. Niemniej jednak w swych późniejszych pismach Reid wydaje 
się sugerować, że takie instynktowne działanie jest wcześniejsze w stosunku do 
działania wolnego, a także je warunkuje. W swym krótkim artykule przedsta-
wiam Reidowską teorię działania, następnie zaś staram się omówić ją tak, aby 
osłabić krytykę Reida przedstawioną przez Louisa Loeba i innych. Twierdzą oni, 
że Reid zadowala się takim opisem działania, które odrzuca jakąkolwiek próbę 
wyjaśnienia przekonań mających swe źródło w ludzkiej naturze. Loeb uznaje, 
że Hume jako filozof przewyższa Reida z tego względu, że do pewnego stopnia 
udaje mu się poddać badaniu naukowemu czarną skrzynkę ludzkiego umysłu. 
Uważam, że Loeb nie ma w tym względzie racji. Chociaż Hume rzeczywiście 
usiłuje podać psychologiczny opis powstania pewnych przekonań, jest on jed-
nak ułomny ze względu na ograniczenia, jakie Hume narzuca na swój własny 
system. Opis Reida zawiera odmienne pojęcie wyjaśnienia; jest on bardziej prze-
konujący, ponieważ nie ogranicza go zbędne podkreślanie roli introspekcji.
Słowa kluczowe: Thomas Reid, działanie, ludzka natura, instynkt, wyjaśnienie, 
filozofia szkocka
